We consider a contracting problem in which a …rm outsources its call center operations to a service provider. The outsourcing …rm (which we term the originator) has private information regarding the rate of incoming calls. The per-call revenue (or margin) earned by the …rm and the service level depend on the sta¢ ng decisions by the service provider. Initially, we restrict attention to pay-per-call contracts under which the parties contract on a service level and a per-call fee. The service provider is modeled as a multi-server queue with a Poisson arrival process, exponentially distributed service times and customer abandonment.
Introduction
The last twenty years have seen an increasing use outsourcing. Beginning in manufacturing, …rms have made greater and greater use of others to do work for them. Over time, this has moved from purchasing simple commodity parts to having suppliers provide complex parts and subassemblies.
For its new 787 Dreamliner, Boeing is counting on outside …rms to deliver doors, landing gear, and even entire wings (Niezen & Weller (2006) ). In the auto industry, it is not uncommon for purchased materials to account for more than half the cost of making a car.
Outsourcing, however, is not just for manufacturing anymore. Recent years have seen a growing trend in outsourcing services. Such outsourcing began with simple ancillary activities such as janitorial services but has grown to include the complete outsourcing of entire business processes (such as order taking) and departments (such as information technology). This has become a big business. TPI, a consulting …rm that specializes in sourcing, estimates that new business process outsourcing (BPO) contracts for the …rst half of 2007 exceeded $30 billion in value, which is actually a decrease from earlier years, cf. Munoz (2007). TPI's estimates do not include government contracts, deals under $50 million, or contracts renewed without the help of outside consultants.
Taking a broader view, Cohen & Young (2006) estimate that the BPO market will exceed threequarters of a trillion dollars by 2008.
Given the growth and importance of service outsourcing, it is worth studying the similarities and di¤erences between outsourcing the delivery of services and the production of physical goods.
The reliance on suppliers to deliver components and subassemblies has been studied extensively in the supply chain management literature. In particular, researchers have studied a wide variety of contracts that govern the supplier-buyer relationship and how these vary with model parameters, available information, and relevant decisions. (See Cachon (2003) , for detailed review.) This work generally takes a simple operational view of the supply chain in order to illuminate the role of economic incentives. Here, we take a similar tack, looking at a basic model in order to show how the move from a supply chain to a service settings alters the nature of optimal contract. Speci…cally, we consider a …rm (which we term the originator) outsourcing its inbound call center to a service provider. Admittedly, call center outsourcing is only one slice of the overall BPO market. However, it is a signi…cant slice. Beasty (2005) estimates that the US call center outsourcing market will reach £ 23.9 billion by 2008 while Beasty (2006) reports that there are over 150 outsourcing vendors for call centers in North America. Further, looking at call centers allows us to focus on a business with well-documented and understood de…nitions of service quality. In other parts of the BPO markets, how to de…ne and measure quality and performance is often a stumbling block to developing successful commercial partnerships (Taylor & Tofts (2006) ).
Call center contracts also take a variety of form. Hourly charges based on the number of call center agents available to take calls for a client are common in the market. 1 Another alternative is a fee for each minute that an agent is engaged with a caller. Yet another possibility is a charge per call handled. (If the distribution of call durations is well understood, per-call and per-minute-engaged charges are equivalent in the long run.) Because the typical call center pays its workers an hourly wage, hourly charges and payments tied to call volume have di¤erent risk implications. Hourly charges insure the call center covers its costs even if agents are idle. When payments are tied to the number of calls coming in, the service provider may not earn enough to recoup its sta¢ ng costs.
As a consequence, per-call payments may be combined with some minimum volume requirements.
Centris Information Systems of Longview, Texas, has contracts pairing a per-minute charge with a minimum utilization level. Accolade Support, an Albuquerque-based vendor, o¤ers packages in which buyers commit to purchasing a minimum number of minutes with additional minutes of service being provided at higher prices. 2 Beyond ongoing charges, call originators typically pay a …xed amount at the start of the contract to cover agent training.
The amount charged for call center services, of course, depends on a number of factors. Complex services (such as order taking or technical support) require more highly skilled agents than simpler tasks (such as lead generation) and thus cost more. The agents serving an originator's may be dedicated to that originator or cross-trained to handle calls from multiple sources. Complex calls favor dedicated agents to reduce training requirements. The targeted service level whether measured by waiting time targets or abandonment rates also matters, with higher service levels increasing costs. This last point is crucial to our analysis. Higher service levels are more costly but just how much more costly depends on the call volume. Call centers naturally exhibit of economies of scale, so it is cheaper on a per call basis to provide good service when the call volume is high. This is re ‡ected in pricing. Accolade Support has a base charge of 83.2c / per minute when a customer commits to buying 600 minutes per month. That drops to 76.9c / per minute when the customer commits to 6,500 minutes per month and to 70.4c / per minute at 27,000 minutes. A call originator thus has an incentive to exaggerate his call volume in order to secure a lower cost, a better service level, or some combination of both.
We explore these issues in a simple contracting setting. The originator needs to hire a provider to service a ‡ow of calls. Calls are revenue generating and better service results in both fewer callers abandoning as well as higher revenues per call. The originator can be one of two types. A high type, as the name implies, anticipates a higher average call volume than a low type. The originator knows her type with certainty but the service provider only has a prior over the two possibilities.
We consider two sequences of play. In the …rst, the service provider moves …rst and o¤ers a menu 2 See www.accoladesupport.com/NewFiles/Accolade%20Support-Pricing.pdf. of contracts. This raises the possibility that the provider may screen the types of customers. In the second, the originator moves …rst, proposing a contract that might signal his private.
Related problems of asymmetric demand information have been studied in the literatures on franchising (Desai & Sirinivasan (1995) ), channel management (Chu (1992) ), and supply chain management (Cachon & Lariviere (2001) ). Like much of this work, we focus on terms of trade that are variations of two part tari¤s. We …rst suppose that contracts consist of a per call fee and a promised service level (measured by the abandonment rate) and later add a lump sum payment as well. While our contracts are standard (both in the industry and the academic literature) our model of the market and the production process deviate from past academic work on contracting with asymmetric demand information. Most work in this area suppose linear production costs and either deterministic demand (given full information) or a newsvendor formulation. Our analysis is built around a queuing model to capture the natural economies of scale in running a call center and to endogenize service measures such as abandonments and average delays.
The switch to a queuing model has a nontrivial impact on the nature of contracting. A basic problem in mechanism design considers a seller o¤ering multiple levels of quality to customer segments that di¤er in their willingness to pay for quality. Providing higher quality is more costly. This leads to the standard results that the most favorable type (i.e., customer segment which is more pro…table) receive an e¢ cient level of quality and captures an information rent. The least favorable type (i.e., customer segment which is less pro…table) receive an ine¢ cient level of quality and are driven to indi¤erence. (See Salanié (1997).) In our setting, these results are reversed 3 . Suppose that the service provider o¤ers the contract.
Here, the high volume provider is the favorable type. If the provider could verify the originator's type, he would provide a high volume originator with a higher quality service (i.e., a lower abandonment rate) in part because the marginal cost of providing good service is decreasing in the originator's call volume. When the provider cannot verify the originator's volume, he o¤ers a menu that distorts the quality provided to the high type. The high type is o¤ered an ine¢ ciently low abandonment rate and is indi¤erent to accepting the contract. The low type, in contrast, is o¤ered the e¢ cient abandonment rate and garners an information rent. These results are slightly modi…ed if the provider also imposes a lump sum payment; if the di¤erence in arrival rates is su¢ ciently 3 We are not the …rst to highlight how the economies of scale inherent in queueing systems alter the economic incentives. Cachon & Harker (2002) examines the impact of queueing economies of scale in a duopoly market. We, however, focus on a vertical as opposed to a horizontal relationship.
large, the high type may receive the e¢ cient level of service but her abandonment rate is still distorted otherwise.
When the order of play is reversed and the originator o¤ers the contract, a high volume originator signals her information by demanding a lower abandonment rate and adjusting her price. Thus, we conclude that asymmetric information results in ine¢ ciently low abandonment rates for high call volumes regardless of who o¤ers the contract. Again, this is modi…ed when a …xed fee is included, which allows a high type to signal her information without distorting her desired service level.
Contract theory provides the framework for analyzing the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries, see Salanié (1997) for an introduction to agency models. Hassin & Haviv (2002) provides a survey for the strategic issues arising in queueing systems. The literature on service contracting for call center operations is thin. Aksin, de Vericourt & Karaesmen (2006) considers a service provider who is faced with an uncertain volume and can outsource all or part of the calls. The authors look at the impact of contract terms on the capacity planning and the nature of the work to be outsourced. In a newsvendor framework, they examine whether the …rm should outsource its base load of calls or its peak calls. Ren & Zhou (2006) studies contracting in a service supply chain and analyzes contracts that can induce the call center to choose optimal sta¢ ng and e¤ort choices. Ren & Zhang (2007) examines service outsourcing contracts when the service provider's cost structure is private information. Hasija, Pinker & Shumsky (2006) considers a variety of contracts for call center outsourcing and shows how di¤erent combinations of the contract features make the …rm to better manage vendors when there is information asymmetry about worker productivity. Milner & Olsen (2007) considers a call center with both contract and non-contract customers, which gives priority to the contract customers only in the o¤-peak hours.
The authors show that under contracts on the percentile of delay, this is the rational behavior on behalf of the call center. They also propose other novel contracts that eliminate such undesirable behavior from the perspective of the contract customers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and analyzes the full-information case. Sections 3 & 4 examine, respectively, screening and signalling with payper-call contracts. Section 5 adds a …xed fee to the contract and section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendices A through C throughout the paper.
The Model
Consider a contracting problem in which an originator outsources her call center operations to a service provider (also referred to as the call center). We assume that the calls are revenue generating and lead to the originator capturing a margin of m. Hence, our model is appropriate for an originator outsourcing order taking as opposed to one outsourcing technical support.
For simplicity, the service system is modeled as a multi-server queue with a Poisson arrival process and exponentially distributed service times. The arrival rate is ; which for the moment is assumed commonly known. Without loss of generality, the mean service time is one. Each customer waiting to be served may abandon, and time-to-abandon is exponentially distributed with rate .
In other words, using the terminology that is standard in queueing theory, we model the call center as a M=M=N + M queue.
We assume that is large, i.e., 1: Thus, the approximation results of Garnett, Mandelbaum & Reiman (2002) for large call centers accurately captures the queueing dynamics in our setting.
Besides developing approximations of various performance metrics for large call centers, Garnett et al. (2002) also argues that economic considerations require managing such large call centers in a Quality-and-E¢ ciency-Driven regime. That, in turn, leads to sta¢ ng decisions based on a squareroot rule. Speci…cally, the number of call-center agents N prescribed by the square-root sta¢ ng rule is
Given Poisson arrivals, p is the of standard deviation of demand arriving per unit of time. is then the system's excess capacity measured in units of the standard deviation of demand per unit of time. We will refer to as the standardized excess capacity. Garnett et al. (2002) shows that the standardized excess capacity captures the impact of capacity decisions on various performance metrics. Consequently, we assume that per-call revenue (or margin) captured by the originator m( ) is a function of the system's standardized excess capacity. We assume m( ) is increasing and concave in : This is in line with the literature that assumes customers respond to the "full" price of the service and are concerned with explicit monetary charges as well as implicit non-monetary delay costs (Hassin & Haviv (2002) (2006) . Speci…cally, we assume the contract speci…es an abandonment probability. Thus, we restrict attention to contracts of the form ( ; c); where is the agreed upon abandonment probability and c is the fee to be paid by the originator to the service provider per answered call.
We borrow the following approximation from Garnett et al. (2002) as a tractable model of call-center operations. The abandonment probability is given 4 by
which provides a good approximation for moderate to large values of : Moreover, we assume that ( ) is a convex decreasing function of the standardized excess capacity : Garnett et al. (2002) provides an explicit formula for ( ) in terms of the hazard rate function of a standard normal random variable, and indeed our assumptions on ( ) are satis…ed for moderate to large values of , which is precisely the regime we are interested in.
For our purposes, the most important feature of the approximation (2) is that it captures the statistical economies of scale phenomenon one expects in large call centers. To elaborate on this, de…ne the standardized excess capacity ( ; ) needed to provide the abandonment rate for a given arrival rate as follows.
where 1 ( ) is the inverse of ( ): Then for a given ; the corresponding standardized excess capacity ( ; ) is decreasing in the arrival rate. In other words, a larger call center is more e¢ cient and can provide better service for a given level of standardized excess capacity, which is precisely due to the economies of scale phenomenon.
For technical simplicity, we assume that the expected margin per incoming call is increasing and concave in the standardized excess capacity. This is formalized in the following assumption.
is concave increasing in :
Finally, we assume the following holds. 4 To be more speci…c, Garnett et al. (2002) proposes the approximation P(Abandonment) = ( )= p N which is equivalent to the approximation (2) asymptotically; and both are justi…ed through the same limiting argument.
Assumption 2 For 0 > 1 and > 1;
(
As the service level increase (i.e., as falls), pro…t per incoming call increases for two reasons. First, a caller is less likely to abandon. Second, a higher service level requires greater excess capacity, increasing margin per answered call. This assumption impose additional structure on how the pro…t per call increases. We are assuming that an increase in the service level is worth more on a per call basis as the arrival rate increase. This is reasonable because the higher volume system starts from a lower level of excess capacity (i.e., ( 0 ; ) < ( 0 ; ) for > 1). It is also similar to the single crossing property generally imposed in the literature (Salanié (1997)).
The optimal full-information service level
To establish a benchmark, we now examine the optimal contract under symmetric information.
Since the per-call payment by the originator to the call center is just a monetary transfer, the problem reduces to choosing the e¢ cient abandonment rate given to maximize the system-wide pro…ts. Hence, the e¢ cient (also called the …rst-best) levels of abandonment probabilities are obtained by solving the following problem. Choose the abandonment probabilities so as to
Recall that (3) provides a one-to-one correspondence between the abandonment probability and the associated standardized excess capacity for each type. Thus, (4) can equivalently be viewed as a problem of choosing the e¢ cient level of standardized excess capacity for each type. That is, choose the standardized excess capacity levels so as to
The following proposition characterizes the …rst-best levels of the standardized excess capacities, denoted by ; and the corresponding …rst-best abandonment probabilities ; its proof is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Given ; the …rst-best standardized excess capacity is given by the unique solution of the following:
and the corresponding …rst-best abandonment probability is given by
Moreover, is increasing and is decreasing in :
Observe that at the …rst-best solution we achieve an e¢ cient allocation in the sense that marginal bene…ts of excess capacity is equal to the marginal cost of sta¢ ng. Moreover, under the e¢ cient allocation, the service provider supplies more excess capacity when the originator has a higher arrival rate. The originator's callers thus receive better service and have a lower abandonment probability. Note that the system pro…t must then be increasing in : Not only are more customers calling the system, they are on average less likely to abandon and will also spend more.
The proposition does not specify the payments between the parties. Once is set, the overall pro…t of the system is …xed and the per-call payment merely splits the pie between the originator and the service provider. The exact value of that payment will depend on the relative bargaining power of the players. Assuming outside options are set to zero, the provider would prefer that c be set as close as possible to m( ); which would leave the originator just indi¤erent to hiring the provider. The originator would prefer that the transfer price be k 1 + = p ; which just allows the provider to recover his sta¢ ng costs.
Screening with Pay-per-call Contracts
We now suppose that the originator is privately informed about her arrival rate. The arrival rate can take two values H ; L with H > L : For i = L; H; let i and i denote, respectively, the optimal standardized excess capacity and optimal abandonment probability when the arrival rate is known to be i . In what follows, we will refer to an originator with arrival rate H as the high type, and an originator with arrival rate L as the low type. While it is obvious to presume the originator knows her market better than the provider, we also assume that the originator cannot simply relay this information to the provider in a credible manner. That is, the originator cannot simply produce market surveys that con…rm her arrival rate. Consequently, unless the originator can take some additional action to demonstrate her type, the provider has only her prior probability p that the originator is a high type.
Here, we consider the service provider o¤ering a pay-per-call contract to the originator without knowing her type. That is, the uninformed party o¤ers a menu of contracts to the informed party to distinguish, or screen, an originator with a high arrival rate from one with a low rate. By the revelation principle, the provider can without loss of generality restrict his search for the optimal terms of trade to contracts of the following form: The call center o¤ers a pair ( i ; c i ) specifying the abandonment probability i and the per-call payment c i for each type i = L; H. Thus, the service provider tries to pick the optimal menu of contracts so as to maximize her expected pro…ts subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions. The precise mathematical formulation of the service provider's problem is as follows:
Commonly referred to as participation constraints, the …rst two constraints impose individual rationality; they ensure that each type of originator prefers the contract designed to not hiring the provider 5 . The incentive compatibility constraint (IC i ) ensures that the originator of type i (i = L; H) prefers the contract devised for her over the contract devised for the other type. When both individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints are satis…ed, each type of originator will self select the contract devised for her. Note that the incentive compatibility constraints capture an important implicit assumption. The parties have contracted on an abandonment probability, not a sta¢ ng or excess capacity level. Hence, if a low-type originator were to take a contract designed for a high-type, the service provider must use excess capacity ( H ; L ) which is greater than ( H ; H ): This assumes that the service provider can quickly deduce the true arrival rate and adjust his sta¢ ng to ful…ll his contractual obligation.
The pro…t of the service provider when serving the type i originator is equal to the pay-per-call 5 We assume that the outside option of each type of originator is zero. However, the results are robust to introducing outside option Ki for type i provided KH = H KL= L. A justi…cation for assuming KH = H KL= L is that if the originator were to establish her own call center and incur the …xed setup plus variable sta¢ ng costs, the pro…t of the high type normalized by the arrival rate would be higher than that of the low type due to economies of scale in queueing systems.
fees c i i (1 i ) minus the sta¢ ng cost necessary to support an abandonment probability of i .
Therefore, the objective function of the service provider maximizes expected pro…ts, where the expectation is taken with respect to the prior the service provider has on the originator's type.
The following proposition characterizes the optimum menu of contracts and its proof is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 The optimal menu of contracts, denoted by f( L ; c L ); ( H ; c H )g; o¤ ered by the service provider is unique and satis…es the following:
where L and H are the …rst-best abandonment probabilities. Moreover, the pay-per-call payments c L and c H are given as follows:
so that the high type originator earns zero pro…t whereas the low type gets a strictly positive information rent.
Relative to the …rst best, the optimal screening contract does not distort the abandonment probability L pro¤ered to the low type but does alter the corresponding service level for the high type, o¤ering an abandonment probability that is ine¢ ciently low. Such distortion is unusual in the literature on monopolist screening. More typically, one has "e¢ ciency at top"and the o¤ering for the more favorable type (i.e., the type that is more pro…table under full information) is not distorted and the favorable type earns an information rent while the less favorable type is pushed to indi¤erence. The reversal of this standard result is driven by the statistical economies of scale phenomenon inherent in queueing systems. Economies of scale induce the service provider to distort the abandonment probability of the high type in order to reduce the information rent of the low type.
To see why this is necessary, notice that for any given , we have ( ; H ) ( ; L ). In words, the service provider needs more standardized excess capacity to provide the low type with the same abandonment rate as the high type. Since the revenue (or margin) per answered call m( ) earned by the originator is an increasing function of , a low type originator who pretends to be a high type obtains a higher per call margin than a true high type originator would. Thus the …rst-best clearly cannot be implemented by pay-per-call contracts since a low volume originator would have an incentive to deviate and enjoy the bene…ts of enhanced service. However, it follows from Assumption 2 that the gain a low type captures by pretending to be a high type decreases as the abandonment rate under the high-type contract is reduced. Thus, if a boost in the high-type service level increases a high type's willingness to pay by a dollar, the low type's willingness to pay for the high service level increase by less than a dollar. Deviating to the high type's contract is consequently less attractive and the service provider can charge the low type a higher price (although the low type still earns a positive pro…t).
Signaling with Pay-per-call Contracts
We now reverse the order of play and have the originator o¤er a contract. There are two basic scenarios to consider. In the …rst, the high and low type originators o¤er distinct terms of trade.
If the high type can devise a contract that the low is unwilling to copy, she e¤ectively signals her private information to service provider. Alternatively, the two types of originators can pool, o¤ering the same contract and leaving the service provider unable to garner additional information.
Recall that the service provider initially has prior beliefs that assign probability p to the originator being a high type and this is commonly known to all parties. Since the contract terms (c; ) may be informative, the service provider updates his beliefs about the type of the originator after seeing the contract o¤er. Let (c; ) denote the belief of the service provider that the originator is of high type after observing a contract o¤er of (c; ). ( (c; ) = p if both types always o¤er the same contract.) The service provider makes the decision to accept or reject the contract based on his posterior (c; ). In particular, he accepts the contract (c; ) if the expected payo¤ of accepting the contract exceeds zero.
We …rst consider the scenario in which the originator signals her information with the goal of characterizing the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. In our setting, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium corresponds to a set of strategies for the originator and the service provider, and a belief function of the service provider, which jointly satisfy the following:
(i ) The strategies are optimal given the belief function .
(ii ) The belief function is derived from the strategies through Bayes'rule whenever possible.
We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria and focus on equilibria satisfying the intuitive criterion of Cho & Kreps (1987) , consistent with most of the literature on signalling games; see, for instance Bagwell & Riordan (1991) , Bagwell & Bernheim (1996) , Schultz (1996) and Choi (1998) .
The intuitive criterion is an equilibrium re…nement which restricts beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path.
In particular, it requires that the updating of beliefs should not assign positive probability to a player taking an action that is equilibrium dominated (in a sense made precise in Appendix B.)
Essentially, the intuitive criterion allows us to eliminate any perfect Bayesian equilibrium from which some type of originator would want to deviate even if she were not sure what exact belief the service provider would have as long as she knows that the provider would not think she is a type who would …nd the deviation equilibrium dominated. Appendix B reviews the formal de…nition of intuitive criterion and proves the following proposition (and others for this section), which provides an equivalent criterion in terms of the primitives of our problem. The following notation is needed to state Proposition 3. Let i (c; ) for i = H; L denote the pro…t of the service provider who accepts contract (c; ) when the arrival rate is i . That is,
Proposition 3 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium with contract o¤ ers ( L ; c L ) and ( H ; c H ) violate the intuitive criterion of Cho & Kreps (1987) , if and only if there exists a type i 2 fL; Hg and a deviation contract ( ; c) such that for j 6 = i,
Let (c H ; H ) and (c L ; L ) denote the contracts o¤ered by the high and low type originators in a separating equilibria. The next proposition characterizes the separating equilibria under the intuitive criterion and is proved in Appendix B.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the intuitive criterion which has the following properties
Moreover, the low type is indi¤ erent between her own contract and the contract o¤ er of the high
Note that H < H . Just as the screening service provider in the previous section found it bene…cial to distort the service level o¤ered the high type, here the high type voluntarily decreases her abandonment probability below the …rst best. There are two consequence to this. First, she must pay more for every call; the high type now pays
per answered call. Second, she earns more for each call since m ( ) is increasing. Moreover, the originator is able to extract all the surplus from the service provider since she is making a take-itor-leave-it o¤er. By Assumption 2, that gain in margin is less for the low type than for the high.
Hence, while the high type lowers her pro…t (relative to the full information case) by asking for a higher service level, it makes mimicking her actions less attractive to the low type.
Before closing this section, we consider whether pooling equilibria might arise. In a pooling equilibrium, the high and low types o¤er the same contract (c; ) and the provider is unable to update his beliefs (i.e., (c; ) = p). The next proposition shows that a pooling equilibrium is not a possible outcome of the signalling game with reasonable beliefs; it is proved in Appendix B.
Proposition 5 There exists no pooling equilibrium that satis…es the intuitive criterion.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that the high type can always exploit economies of scale in order to distinguish herself from the low type while such a deviation would be dominated for the low type.
Introducing a Fixed Fee
We now expand the contracts the parties may use by introducing a …xed fee. The terms of trade are ( ; c; T ); where and c are, as before, the agreed upon abandonment probability and per-call fee and T is a payment from the originator to the service provider that is independent of the realized call volume. There are several reasons for considering such a payment. First, call center outsourcing contracts frequently include such payments to cover initial training and set up costs. Second, they allow the contract terms to somewhat mimic the economies of scale of the underlying queuing system. Finally, two part tari¤s have proven e¤ective instruments in other studies of contracting under asymmetric information (see, for example, Chu (1992) ). To see why they might be useful in our setting, note that for a given ; a high-type originator is indi¤erent between paying c > 0 per call answered with no …xed fee and paying a …xed fee of c H with no per-call charge. A low-type originator, however, obviously is not, preferring the low …xed payment and higher variable rate.
We now show a …xed fee may be su¢ cient to recover e¢ ciency in both the screening and signalling scenarios. Proposition 6 deals with the former case while Proposition 7 deals with the latter. 6 Their proof are in Appendix C. Proposition 6 Let L and H denote the …rst-best abandonment probabilities. The optimal menu of contracts, denoted by f( L ; c L ; T L ); ( H ; c H ; T H )g; o¤ ered by the service provider is given as follows:
; then the service provider o¤ ers the …rst-best abandonment probabilities. That is,
As for the per-call payments, the service provider can choose any (c L ; c H ) such that
provided that the …xed fees T L and T H are as follows:
; then the abandonment probabilities o¤ ered by the service provider are uniquely determined. To be speci…c, the service provider o¤ ers the …rst-best abandonment probability to the low type, i.e. L = L , while he o¤ ers a lower abandonment probability to the high type than the …rst-best level, i.e. H < H . Moreover, the …xed fee and per-call payment of the high type are uniquely determined as follows:
so that the high type originator earns zero pro…ts, while the service provider can choose any per-call payment c L for the low type such that 6 We do not explicitly consider pooling when the originator o¤ers the contract. One can derive a result similar to Proposition 5 that rules out a pooling equilibrium.
provided
In particular,
so that the low type originator earns positive information rent.
Proposition 7 Let L and H denote the …rst-best abandonment probabilities.
then any (pure strategy) separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the intuitive criterion has the following properties:
that is, the low and high type originators o¤ er the …rst-best abandonment probabilities. As for the per-call payments, the originators can choose any (c L ; c H ) such that
so that both the high and low type originator extract all the surplus.
(ii) If (15) does not hold, then for any (pure strategy) separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the intuitive criterion, the abandonment probabilities are determined uniquely, and they satisfy the following:
where H is such that the low type originator is indi¤ erent between her contract and the contract o¤ er of the high type; and the low type originator o¤ ers the …rst-best abandonment probability.
Moreover, the …xed fee and per-call payment of the high type originator, c H and T H , are also uniquely determined as follows
whereas the low type originator can choose any per-call payment c L such that
and, hence there is multiplicity in the choice of (c L ; T L ).
Adding a …xed fee has similar a¤ects on both the screening and signalling scenarios. For both, if there is su¢ cient di¤erentiation between the volume of calls for high and low types (exactly what is su¢ cient depends on the scenario), a …xed fee is enough to restore e¢ ciency. Both types receive their …rst best service levels, and (in the screening case) the low type no longer captures any information rents. In these setting multiple possible equilibrium contracts exist. Intuitively, one option is always to have the high type pay just a …xed fee with no per-call charge. If the low type strictly prefers her full information contract to these terms, there is a multiplicity of contract because the …xed fee of the high type could be lowered and a per-call charge added that leaves the total payment of the high type unchanged but is still unattractive to the low type.
This changes when there is not much di¤erence between the arrival rates. Now if the high type were to receive its …rst best service level and pay only a …xed fee, a low type would want to take that contract. E¤ective screening or signalling thus again requires distorting the service level. The amount of the distortion is less than before. By sticking with a …xed fee and no per-call charge, the equilibrium takes the contract form that is least attractive to the low type in order to minimize the system loss due to deviation from the …rst best. In the case of screening, this also lowers the information rent paid to the low type.
Note that the …xed fee contract has much in common with the terms o¤ered by call center vendors. As discussed above, Accolade Support o¤ers packages that require originators to essentially pre-pay for a …xed number of minutes and then pay higher per minute rates when demand exceeds the pre-paid quantity. Similarly, Centris Information Systems may set a minimum utilization which e¤ectively commits the originator to paying for some number of calls. Here, under both screening and signalling, it is always possible to have high volume originator paying just a …xed fee with no per-call charge. This is equivalent to committing to a minimum purchase quantity that a low volume originator …nds unattractive.
Discussion
We have examined how asymmetric demand information can a¤ect contracting between two parties.
Where past studies have focused on deterministic demand curves or newsvendor problems, we assume a call center, an important and growing part of the business process outsourcing market.
Focusing on a call center naturally leads us to using a queuing framework. Queuing systems exhibit economies of scale and this leads to signi…cant changes in the contract terms. In particular,
while monopoly screening problems do not generally recommend distorting the o¤ering to the most favorable type, here we …nd that it is optimal to o¤er a high volume originator an ine¢ ciently high level of service. Further, a low volume originator ends up earning a positive information rent. One sees a similar distortion when we switch to a signalling setting; a high type requests (and pays for) a service level so high that the low type does not …nd it worth copying her request. The amount of distortion in both the screening and signalling settings is reduced if the contracts are expanded to include a …xed fee.
We have taken the abandonment probability as our measure of service. This is largely done to increase the transparency of the presentation. Alternatively, one could have other service level criterion such as an upper bound on the probability of waiting more than a certain amount. Indeed, for such criterion, one can use approximations similar to ours to show that our structural results continue to hold. To isolate the e¤ect of the curvature on the distortions in the optimal contracts, we consider revenue functions m n for n 0:1, where we only change the function to the right of H as n changes. We also make sure that m n is smooth. This construction ensures that the …rst-best excess capacity levels are the same for each n. Our construction also ensures that the revenue function m n becomes more an more ‡at to the right of H as n increases. To be speci…c, the functions we consider are given as follows: For n 0:1
where w n = 8 + (0:1=n 1) =( H ) 0:1 and s n = (0:1=n)( H ) n 0:1 . Figure 1 depicts the revenue function for di¤erent values of n. The curvature of m increases with n.
The tables we provide next display how the distortion of the abandonment probability H of the high volume originator relative to the …rst-best level H changes in the screening and signalling scenarios as the curvature of the revenue function increases.
In both cases the distortions decreases as n increases. Intuitively, as the revenue function becomes ‡atter, it becomes more costly to separate the high and low volume originators using a distortion of standardized excess capacity. 
Revenue Functions

A Proofs in Sections 2.1 and 3
Proof of Proposition 1. The …rst order condition, which is necessary and su¢ cient by Assumption 1, gives
By Assumption 1, we have is increasing in . Then, is decreasing since is decreasing.
Lemma 1 The constraints (IR H
and (IC L ) of the service provider's screening problem bind at an optimum contract.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose (IR H ) does not bind. Then, increasing c H by a small amount is more pro…table to the service provider. Clearly, we can do this if (IC H ) does not bind, because increasing c H relaxes (IC L ). Therefore, we restrict attention to the possibility that (IC H ) binds.
In that case, we have that 
Therefore, (IR L ) does not bind either. Then, consider increasing c H by 1 H and c L by 1 L for su¢ ciently small > 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraints are not violated since we decrease both sides by ; but the objective value of the service provider's screening problem increases strictly, which contradicts optimality. Thus, (IR H ) binds at an optimum contract.
Now suppose that (IC L ) does not bind. Since (IR H ) binds by the above argument, we have
where the right hand side is strictly positive since
does not bind either. Also note that increasing c L by a su¢ ciently small > 0 relaxes (IC H ). Thus, we can increase c L by a su¢ ciently small > 0, in which case (IR L ) and (IC L ) are still satis…ed and we get a strictly better objective value, contradicting the optimality. Thus, (IC L ) binds.
Proof of Proposition 2. First notice that we have the following relations for any given abandonment probabilities L and H :
which is due to statistical economies of scale inherent in queueing systems. Also recall that (IR H ) and (IC L ) binds at an optimum contract by Lemma 1. Then, (IR L ) is also satis…ed since
where the …rst equality follows from the fact that (IC L ) binds, the second line is true since ( H ; L ) ( H ; H ) and the last line follows from (IR H ).
We proceed with the service provider's screening problem ignoring the constraint (IC H ) for now.
We will …rst characterize the optimal solution to a relaxed problem, which ignores (IC H ), and then verify that (IC H ) is indeed satis…ed by that solution in the end. Given that (IR H ) and IC L bind by Lemma 1, we can solve for c H and c L , which gives the following:
Then, substituting (23) and (24) into the objective function of the service provider's problem (ignoring (IC H ) for now) we arrive at the following problems. Choose the abandonment probabilities L and H so as to maximize
It is easy to see that the optimal level of L is equal to L , the …rst-best level. To …nd the optimum H , we consider the following problem, which ignores the terms that do not depend on H : Choose the abandonment probability H for the high type so as to
By (3), the maximization problem (26) can equivalently be stated as a problem of choosing the optimal standardized excess capacity H as follows: Choose H so as to
where b H is de…ned as a function of H through the relation
The …rst order conditions for (27) give
where the second term
0 by Assumption 2. To see this, notice that Assumption 2 can be rewritten as follows using simple algebraic manipulations:
Then, the term
can be expressed as a function of the abandonment probability H through the relation (3) as follows:
which is nonpositive and increasing as H decreases by Assumption 2. This is equivalent to have h (1
i increasing as a function of H , cf. (3). Then comparing (5) with (28) yields H H by Assumption 1, which in turn implies, cf. (2), that
Then it follows from Assumption 2 that
which in turn is equivalent to (cf. 3)
Recall that we had ignored (IC H ) while we solve the above maximization problem. What remains is to check whether (IC H ) is satis…ed in this solution. For that,the right hand side of (IC H ) is zero, since (IR H ) binds. Then rewrite (IC H ) as follows:
Substituting (24) into (30), an rearranging terms we see that checking whether (IC H ) is satis…ed is equivalent to checking whether the following holds:
which is precisely (29). Thus, (IC H ) is satis…ed.
Finally, note that the high type originator earns zero pro…ts by (23); and it follows from (24) and the fact that m( ( H ; L )) > m( ( H ; H )) that the low type originator gets strictly positive information rent.
B Proofs and Auxiliary Derivations for Section 4
In this appendix, we prove the results in Section 4 and provide some auxiliary results necessary for proofs. We also reviews the formal de…nition of the intuitive criterion of Cho & Kreps (1987) , which we specialize for our setting.
Intuitive Criterion. The idea of this re…nements is that reasonable beliefs should not assign positive probability to a player taking an action that is strictly dominated (in a sense to be made precise) for her. To formalize this, for any nonempty set fH; Lg, let S ( ; (c; )) fAccept, Rejectg denote the set of possible equilibrium responses by the service provider that can arise after contract o¤er (c; ) is observed for some beliefs satisfying the property that (c; ) = 1 if = fHg and (c; ) = 0 if = fLg. That is, the set S ( ; (c; )) contains the equilibrium responses by the service provider to the contract choice (c; ) for some beliefs that assign positive probability to types only in the set . When we have = fH; Lg, this construction puts no restriction on the beliefs.
We now introduce the notion of equilibrium dominance. To facilitate our analysis, we introduce the following de…nitions with a slight abuse of notation. Let H (c; ; s) denote the pro…t of a high type originator if she o¤ers the contract (c; ) and the service provider's decision is s 2 fAccept,
Rejectg. Then, we have
Similarly de…ne L (c; ; s) as the pro…t of the low type originator if she o¤ers a contract (c; ) and the service provider's decision is s 2 fAccept, Rejectg: Let (c H ; H ) and (c L ; L ) denote the contract o¤ers of the high and low type originators in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with belief system . The equilibrium responses by the call center to the contract o¤ers (c H ; H ) and (c L ; L )
should be to accept since otherwise the originator would not be maximizing her payo¤. We then say that a contract (c; ) is equilibrium dominated for the high type in this perfect Bayesian equilibrium
We similarly de…ne the contracts that are equilibrium dominated for the low type. Then, for each contact (c; ), we de…ne the set (c; ) as the set of types for which (c; ) is not equilibrium dominated. Finally, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium with contract o¤ers (c H ; H ) and (c L ; L ) and belief system is said to violate the intuitive criterion if there exists a type 2 fH; Lg and a contract (c; ) such that Min s2S ( (c; ); (c; )) (c; ; s) > (c ; ; Accept).
For instance, a pooling equilibrium with contract o¤er (e c; e ) and the belief system violate the intuitive criterion if there exists a type and a deviation (c; ) that yields higher pro…t for type than her equilibrium pro…t as long as the call center does not assign a positive probability to a type for which the deviation (c; ) is equilibrium dominated.
The following lemma is nothing but the "if part" of Proposition 3, which is really what is needed for the following proofs. Thus, we next state and prove Lemma 2; and we will eventually prove the "only if" part of Proposition 3, which provides a criterion (in terms of problem primitives) equivalent to the intuitive criterion in our setting.
Lemma 2 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium with contract o¤ ers (c L ; L ) an (c H ; H ) violate the intuitive criterion of Cho & Kreps (1987) if there exists a type i 2 fL; Hg and a deviation contract (e c; e ) such that
Proof of Lemma 2. In any equilibrium we have i (c i ; i ;Accept) 0 for i = L; H. Thus, in
(32), we should have S ( (c; ); (c; )) = fAcceptg. This, in turn, implies that a contract ( ; c)
(which ensures S ( (c; ); (c; )) = fAcceptg).
We will use the following lemma to construct deviations of the form given in Lemma 2; and we will eventually prove the "only if" part of Proposition 3, which provides a criterion at various places in what follows.
Lemma 3 Consider candidate equilibrium contract o¤ ers (c L ; L ) and (c H ; H ) (not necessarily di¤ erent, i.e. we allow for (c L ; L ) = (c H ; H )) o¤ ered by the low and high type originators,
, then there exists a deviation ( ; c) for the high type such that
Thus, f(c L ; L ) ; (c H ; H )g cannot correspond to outcomes of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion.
Proof of Lemma 3. To construct such a deviation for the high type, choose < L and set c such that
Recall that 1
Then substituting (34) into this and rearranging terms give
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2. Then, (35) can equivalently be written as
Similarly we have that
where the inequality follows from Assumption 2. Clearly, (36) is equivalent to
where the right hand side is equal to H ( L ; c L ) by de…nition, which, in turn, is equal to H ( H ; c H )
by assumption. Thus, we have
Moreover, since ( L ; c L ) and ( H ; c H ) are equilibrium outcomes, the service provider will assign positive probability to the originator being a low type upon seeing the contract o¤er
Then we have that
Then we also have that
The proof is then complete by Lemma 2. Finally, note that nowhere in this proof we assumed (c L ; L ) 6 = (c H ; H ).Thus, this result can be used to construct deviations from a pooling equilibrium as well.
Next, we prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4. We follow the 4-step approach outlined next.
Step 1: Characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a solution to an optimization problem.
Step 2: Characterize/solve the optimization problem identi…ed in Step 1.
Step 3: Show that the equilibrium characterized in Step 2 satis…es the intuitive criterion.
Step 4: Check that the only perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion is the one characterized in Step 2.
Step 1. Here we …rst focus on a speci…c separating equilibrium where the out of equilibrium beliefs are de…ned as follows: The service provider believes the originator to be a low type if he sees a contact o¤er di¤erent than (c H ; H ), the equilibrium contract o¤er of the high type originator. We will eventually show that the equilibrium we derived under this belief system is the unique (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion without any speci…c assumptions on the belief system. To this end, we …rst derive the constraints which have to be satis…ed by a pair f(c L ; L ); (c H ; H )g of separating equilibrium contract o¤ers. Consider the contract choice of the low type under the belief system that assigns probability zero to the originator being a high type upon seeing a contract o¤er other than (c H ; H ). Then, the contract o¤er (c L ; L ) is sequentially rational for the low type if it yields a pro…t that is better than any possible deviation. If the low type deviates to a contract (c; ) 6 = (c H ; H ), then the service provider believes she is a low type. Thus, if (c; ) is accepted by the service provider, the low type gets pro…t L (c; ). Therefore, the best deviation for the low type to a contract (c; ) 6 = (c H ; H ), then solves the following maximization problem: Choose the contract o¤er (c; ) so as to maximize L (c; )
The constraint in this maximization problem always binds. Thus, the problem is the same as maximizing the surplus in the system. The solution is given by the …rst best level = L as in (5)- (6), and we have
Therefore, any deviation for the low type to a contract (c; ) 6 = (c H ; H ) yields less pro…t for the low type. Then, for (c L ; L ) = (c L ; L ) to be sequentially rational, it should also give higher pro…ts for the low type than the equilibrium contract o¤er (c H ; H ) of the high type. That is, we must
We next consider the sequential rationality of the contract choice (c H ; H ) of the high type. If the high type deviates from (c H ; H ), under the belief system , the call center will believe that she is a low type. Thus, the best such deviation will solve the following problem: Choose the contract o¤er (c; ) so as to maximize H (c; )
Note that the constraint (39) re ‡ects the fact that the service provider accepts the contract believing that it is o¤ered by a low type originator. It is easy to see that the constraint (39) will always bind in optimum contract solving the problem (38)-(39). Thus, we can equivalently state (38)- (39) as follows: Choose the abandonment probability so as to
which, in turn, can also be posed as a problem of choosing the standardized capacity to
where b is de…ned as a function of implicitly through the relation
The …rst order condition associated with the problem (41) can be written as
where @ b =@ can be calculated using the implicit function theorem. More speci…cally, de…ne the function ' such that
We have that
Substituting this into (43), the …rst order condition becomes
where the right hand side is strictly less than k= p H since b > and
comparing (44) with (5) and using Assumption 1, we see that the optimum solution e to the problem (42) satis…es e > H , where H is the …rst best level. This implies that the optimal abandonment probability e for the problem 38)-(39), or equivalently for the problem (40), satis…es
where H is the …rst-best abandonment probability. Thus, the sequential rationality of (c H ; H ) requires that
where
The last constraint the contract (c H ; H ) has to satisfy is that it has to be accepted by the call center. Since (c H ; H ) = 1; this translate into the constraint
In summary, for (c L ; L ) and (c H ; H ) to be equilibrium contract o¤ers we must have (c L ; L ) = (c L ; L ) and that (c H ; H ) should solve the following problem: Choose (c; ) so as to maximize H (c; )
subject to
The problem (48)- (51) characterizes the equilibrium contract o¤ers, completing Step 1.
Step 2. We now focus on solving the problem (48)- (51). Clearly, we can reformulate the problem (48)- (51) as one of choosing (1 H )c H and H . Without loss of generality, set
Then,we can rewrite the problem as one of choosing " H and H optimally. Substituting (52) into (49)- (51), we can write the constraints as follows:
where h( ) and g L ( ) are de…ned as
Then, we can equivalently express the problem (48)-(51) as choosing " H and H so as to maximize e g( H ) + " H subject to
We further simplify the problem as follows: Choose " H and H to maximize e g( H ) + " H
. That is, we consider the following maximization problem in which we choose ; H so as to maximize (56) subject to
To characterize the solution to the problem (56)- (58), we make the following observations.
Observation 1:
(i ) g H ( ) achieves its unique maximum at H .
(ii ) g H ( ) > e g( ) for all 2 (0; 1]. Moreover, g H ( ) > g H (e ) > e g(e ) for e < < H .
(iii ) There exists a unique < e such that g H ( ) = e g(e ):
It is easy to see that part (i ) follows from Assumption 1 and the …rst order condition (??). We
g(e ) for e < < H from Part (i ). Part (iii ) simply follows from Part (ii ) and monotonicity of g H .
Assumption 2 implies that f ( ) is decreasing. We have
f (e ) > e g(e ), f ( ) if decreasing and < e .
Observation 3: There exists a unique H 2 ( ; H ) such that f ( H ) = g H ( H ), which also satis…es f ( H ) > e g(e ). Moreover, (c H ; H ), where
is the unique optimal solution of (48)- (51).
To see why H and c H as in (59) is the unique optimal solution of (48)- (51), recall that the constraint (57), or equivalently (54), binds at an optimum solution. Then, since the constraint (57) was obtained from (50) through the relation (52), " H denote the slack in (50). The fact that (57) binds at the optimum implies that " H = 0 and hence, H and c H as in (59) constitute an equilibrium contract o¤er for the high type.
Therefore, (c L ; L ) and (c H ; H ) as characterized in Observation 3 are the equilibrium contract o¤ers by the low and high types, under the belief system . The next step is to this equilibrium satis…es the intuitive criterion.
Step 3.
Let (c L ; L ) and (c H ; H ) denote the contract o¤ers by the high and low type originators in the separating equilibrium of Step 2. The high and low type originators earn the following pro…ts:
We will show that there for both the low and high types, there exists no deviation that would violate the intuitive criterion. We …rst consider the potential deviations by the low type. Since we
the low type would not deviate to a contract that would be rejected by the call center. Put more formally, for there to be a deviation (c; ) for the low type such that
we should have that S ( (c; ); (c; )) = fAcceptg. Suppose such a deviation (c; ) exists.
This immediately implies that
(c; ) 6 = ?. Recall that by de…nition, the set S ( (c; ); (c; )) contains the equilibrium responses by the call center to the contract choice (c; ) for some beliefs that assign positive probability to types only in the set (c; ). Then, to have S ( (c; ); (c; )) = fAcceptg, the contract (c; ) has to satisfy
in which case we have
as L is the …rst best level of abandonment rate for the low type, contradicting the assumption that (c; ) is a deviation that yields higher for the low type originator. Now consider two cases that might potentially arise. In the …rst case, we have (c; ) = fHg. If (c; ) = fHg, to have S ( (c; ); (c; )) = fAcceptg, it should be that
Moreover, by the de…nition of the set (c; ) = fHg; we must also have
(1
However, this would contradict the sequential rationality of the contract choice (c H ; H ) in the separating equilibrium Step 2. Thus, there exits no deviation (c; ) for the high type such that (c; ) = fHg and the intuitive criterion is violated.
In the second case, we have (c; ) = fH; Lg. If (c; ) = fH; Lg, then to have S ( (c; ); (c; )) = fAcceptg, we must have
Then, the best possible pro…t a the high type originator could get from a deviation (c; ) that satisfy (60) is
where e is given by (45). From (46), the deviation (c; ) yields less pro…ts for the high type originator than u H (c H ; H ). Thus, no deviation exists for the high type that would violate the intuitive criterion and the equilibrium in Step 2 satis…es the intuitive criterion.
Step 4. We now show that the separating equilibrium characterized in Step 2 is the unique outcome that might arise as a separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion.
To check this, let f(c H ; H ) ; (c L ; L )g be an arbitrary separating equilibrium contract o¤ers satisfying the intuitive criterion. First, we show that we must have
That is, the contract o¤er of the low type originator does not leave any surplus to the service provider. Second, we show that we must have L = L . Finally, we show that H and c H are as characterized in Step 2. In particular, they satisfy
To show that (61) holds, we argue by contradiction. Note that in a separating equilibrium, upon seeing the low type's contract o¤er (c L ; L ), the service provider knows that she is low type.
Since the service provider accepts the contract o¤ered in equilibrium, we must have that
Thus, we only need to rule out the possibility that
Suppose (62) 
for small enough. Therefore, we restrict attention to the case
, that is, the high type is indi¤erent between his contract and that of the low type, but then one can invoke Lemma 3 to …nd a deviation (c; ) for the high type originator such that
which is a contradiction. Thus, the low type extracts all the surplus from the service provider in any separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion.
Next, we prove that L = L , for which we use the fact that
We argue by contradiction, i.e. 
then the high type can increase H slightly and set
which will yield strictly higher pro…ts for her, while the low type would strictly prefer
deviate and o¤er a contract that is accepted. Since (e c; e ) is accepted in the equilibrium by the service provider, we have
Next, we show that the high type has a deviation that violates the intuitive criterion. It is easy to see that there exists a deviation (c; ) for the high type as in Lemma 3 deviation contract (e c; e )
such that
which is a contradiction. Thus, there exists no pooling equilibrium that satis…es the intuitive criterion.
Proof of Proposition 3. The "if part" of Proposition 3 was established in Lemma 2. We now prove the "only if" part of Proposition 3. Namely, we prove that if for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with contract o¤ers ( L ; c L ) and ( H ; c H ), there exists no type i 2 fL; Hg and no deviation contract ( ; c) such that 
C Proofs in Section 5
First note , that in the screening scenario, the service provider's problem is:
where the …rst two constraints enforce individual rationality while the last two are incentive compatibility constraints.
Proof of Proposition 6.We …rst consider the case when the following condition holds:
We will …rst analyze the screening problem of the service provider without the constraints. This will give us unique levels of the abandonment probabilities to be o¤ered to the high and low type originators. Then, we will show that there exists (c L ; T L ) and (c H ; T H ) such that we can actually implement the optimal abandonment probabilities found previously, i.e. the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are satis…ed. This clearly gives us an optimal solution to the screening problem of the service provider. Finally, we characterize the possible values of (c L ; T L ) and (c H ; T H ) that can implement the optimal abandonment probabilities.
If we consider the screening problem of the service provider where the service provider extracts all the surplus from the high and low type originators and the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are ignored, it is easy to see that the optimal abandonment probabilities are given uniquely by the …rst best levels, cf. Proposition 1. That is, the optimal abandonment probabilities are given as follows L = L and H = H :
Next, we prove that there exists (c L ; T L ) and (c H ; T H ) that satisfy the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints given (8 since (64) 
by (IR H ). Substituting (66) into (IC L ) and rearranging terms yields
Next we plug the expressions for T H + H (1 
It is easy to see that the optimizing level of L is equal to L , the …rst best level. 
where T L + L (1 L )c L is given by (67). Then, (IC H ) is most likely to be satis…ed when c L is as large as possible. Thus, let T L = 0, and (IC H ) becomes
which is satis…ed by Assumption 2 and the fact that H > L .
Proof of Proposition 7. We …rst consider the case when (15) holds. Then, it is easy to see that the contract o¤er characterized in part (i) of Proposition 7 is a separating equilibrium with a belief system that assigns probability zero for the originator being a high type upon seeing a contract o¤er other than ( H ; c H ; T H ). The proof that this equilibrium satis…es the intuitive criterion is very similar to the proof of Step 3 of Proposition 4. Then, we prove that this equilibrium is the unique separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion as follows: The argument that
) and L = L is very similar to the argument in
Step 4 of the proof of Proposition 4, and is actually proved while we consider Part (ii 
Second, we show that we must have L = L . Third, we prove that c H = 0. Finally, we show that H < H and 
